

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 11488

EXDIS

USUN FOR MCHENRY ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, GW, WA, XA
SUBJECT: BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA: NAMIBIA

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE'S CONSULTATIONS IN BONN (JULY 17) COVERED THE GAMUT OF AFRICAN TOPICS. NAMIBIA, HOWEVER, WAS A PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE TALKS. (OTHER SUBJECTS REPORTED SEPTELS.) THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S CONVERSATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE'S AFRICA AND PLANNING SECTIONS, HEADED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MUELLER.

2. MUELLER INITIATED THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE TALKS ON NAMIBIA BY REVIEWING FOR MOOSE THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DISCUSSIONS ON NAMIBIA OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING (JULY 16). ACCORDING TO MUELLER, THE MINISTERS HAD AGREED THAT THE FIVE'S NAMIBIA PROPOSAL SHOULD BE INTRODUCED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
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TIME. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED, HE SAID, THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN NEW YORK AT THE TIME OF THE TABLING WOULD LEND ADDED WEIGHT TO THE WESTERN PRESENTATION. AFTER EXAMINING THEIR RESPECTIVE SCHEDULES, THE MINISTERS PROPOSED THAT FRIDAY, JULY 28 WAS AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO MEET, ALLOWING FOUR DAYS FOR COMPLETION OF THE UNSC PROCESS UNDER THE CANADIAN PRESIDENCY. THE MINISTERS

ALSO AGREED THAT BOTHA SHOULD BE INFORMED ABOUT THE WESTERN PLANS AND THAT THE OPTION SHOULD BE OPENED TO HIM TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK HIMSELF TO PRESENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE. IN ADDITION, IF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE PRESENT, THE FRONT LINE STATES AND NIGERIA SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AS WELL, POSSIBLY ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.

3. MUELLER, HOWEVER, WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THE PRESENCE OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK MIGHT AFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PROPOSAL'S PASSAGE. THERE WAS A DANGER, HE FEARED, THAT MINISTERIAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE MISCONSTRUED. MUELLER ASKED MOOSE FOR HIS VIEWS ON THIS POINT. MOOSE REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE TO SPEAK WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK BEFORE COMING TO A FIRM CONCLUSION, HIS INCLINATION WAS TO WAIT FOR AN INDICATION OF HOW THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' PRESENTATION WAS GOING BEFORE ADVISING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS BE INJECTED INTO THE FRAY. ON THE QUESTION OF BOTHA'S PRESENCE, MOOSE POINTED TO THE DANGER OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NUJOMA AND BOTHA. MUELLER OPINED THAT STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL WOULD PROBABLY AGREE, WHICH, IN FACT, HE DID IN A MEETING LATER THE SAME DAY. VAN WELL TOLD MOOSE THAT, IN HIS VIEW, PRESENCE OF THE MINISTERS OF THE WESTERN FIVE SHOULD BE TIED TO SIMILAR AFRICAN REPRESENTATION. CONFIDENTIAL

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VAN WELL SAID HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS POINT WITH GENSCHER, AND THAT HE FELT RESTRAINT WAS IN ORDER. (FYI: MOOSE REVIEWED THIS QUESTION WITH SECRETARY VANCE IN LONDON JULY 19. SECRETARY DEFINITELY BELIEVES FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE PRESENT PROVIDED OAU SUMMIT, AS EXPECTED, ENDORSES CG PROPOSAL. SECRETARY SAID FOREIGN MINISTERS DID NOT DISCUSS INVITATION TO BOTHA AND THAT HE WOULD NOT FAVOR SUCH A MOVE.)

4. INITIATING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION TO SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE, MUELLER NOTED THE IMPRESSION OF THE FIVE AMBASSADORS IN PRETORIA THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD INITIALLY HAD AN INCORRECT PERCEPTION OF WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN LUANDA. PERHAPS, HE SAID, THE HARD SAG REACTION MAY HAVE BEEN BASED UPON A GLIMPSE AT COPY OF THE SWAPO DRAFT ON WALVIS BAY RATHER THAN ON THE FINAL DRAFT. IN MUELLER'S OPINION, THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE OF A "LIMITED CHANGE" IN SAG ATTITUDES SINCE THEIR FIRST

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RESPONSE. IT SEEMED THAT THE WEST'S APPROACH TO BOTHA
HAD HAD A REAL EFFECT. MOOSE AGREED THAT SOUTH AFRICA
SEEMS TO HAVE MADE A DECISION TO LET THE PROCESS
CONTINUE, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY, MUELLER STATED HIS
VIEW THAT THE FIVE SHOULD BE IN NO RUSH TO TURN OVER A
TEXT OF OUR SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE SAG.
THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOW HAD AN ACCURATE IDEA OF WHAT THE
FIVE HAVE IN MIND AND TO GIVE THEM A HARD COPY OF THE
TEXT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS AN INVITATION TO BEGIN
NEGOTIATIONS. TO MUELLER, BOTHA'S PUBLIC TREATMENT OF
WALVIS BAY HAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ENCLAVE TO SOUTH AFRICA REMINDED
MUELLER, HE SAID, OF A CONVERSATION HE ONCE HAD WITH
FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE IN BONN, AMBASSADOR
SOLE. SOLE HAD TOLD HIM OF A LONG-STANDING SOUTH
AFRICAN PLAN TO CONVERT WALVIS BAY INTO A FREE HARBOR
AND THE CENTER OF A FAR-REACHING RAILWAY NETWORK.
MUELLER NOTED THAT THE FIVE AMBASSADORS IN PRETORIA
HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF SOME SORT OF NEUTRALIZATION
OF WALVIS BAY AND THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME ROOM FOR
MANEUVER ON THIS POINT. MOOSE AGREED THIS MIGHT BE A
POSSIBILITY. A GUARANTEE OF CONTINUED ACCESS, IN
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MOOSE'S VIEW, WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACCEPT THE LOSS OF DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE ENCLAVE. MUELLER RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING OUR THINKING ON THIS POINT INFORMALLY WITH FOURIE IN AN EFFORT TO DISCOVER NEW WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE WALVIS BAY ISSUE AND MOOSE AGREED THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP.

6. CONCERNING INTERNAL NAMIBIAN DEVELOPMENTS AND GROUPINGS, MUELLER SHARED WITH MOOSE THE FRG'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE NNF. A NNF DELEGATION HAD RECENTLY VISITED THE FRG AND WAS RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION WITH THEM COVERED A RANGE OF TOPICS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE NNF ADMITTED HAVING HAD CONTACTS WITH SHIPANGA AND ACKNOWLEDGED PLANS FOR ANOTHER MEETING WITH HIM IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY IN PARIS), THE NNF SEEMED PRIMARILY SEEKING THE FRG'S ADVICE ON HOW TO REACT TO AN EXPECTED SWAPO REJECTION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. SHOULD THEY PARTICIPATE IN OR BOYCOTT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT? GENSCHER'S ADVICE WAS TO WAIT AND SEE. AFTERWARD, HOWEVER, THE NNF HAD INDICATED TO ITS FRIEDRICH NEUMANN FOUNDATION SPONSORS (FDP-FINANCED POLITICAL FOUNDATION) THAT IT PLANNED TO SEEK FRG SUPPORT ON ITS CLAIM TO BE HEARD BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MUELLER NOTED THAT THE FRG MUST TAKE THE NNF SERIOUSLY; IT HAS SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE FRG AND IT SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY GROUPING WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE FIVE'S THINKING ON NAMIBIA, AS WELL AS WITH THAT OF THE FRONT LINE AND THE CHURCHES.

7. VAN WELL RETURNED TO THIS TOPIC IN HIS TALKS WITH MOOSE LATER IN THE DAY. VAN WELL SUGGESTED THAT SOME THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO OFFICIAL CONTACTS IN WINDHOEK
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DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE FRG'S POLITICAL CONTACTS, HE NOTED, WERE ALREADY SUBSTANTIALLY LAID THROUGH CONTACTS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL FRG ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE CHURCHES. THE FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION (SPD-FINANCED) HAS GOOD CONTACTS WITH SWAPO, ESPECIALLY IN LUSAKA; THE FRIEDRICH NEUMANN FOUNDATION (FDP-FINANCED) HAS CONTACTS WITH THE NNF; AND THE

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CDU/CSU OPPOSITION (THROUGH THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION) MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH THE DTA. MUELLER CAUTIONED THAT CARE MUST BE TAKEN SO THESE CONTACTS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE NEGOTIATIONS AND ADDED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, ADDITIONAL THOUGHT MIGHT BE GIVEN TO THE BROAD OUTLINES OF PROSPECTIVE AID TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA. VAN WELL AGREED, NOTING THAT THE FRG HAS SOME "RESERVE FUNDS" SET ASIDE FOR THIS PURPOSE. MOOSE SAID THAT NO AID FUNDS EARMARKED FOR NAMIBIA WERE CONTAINED IN CURRENT LEGISLATION BUT THAT THOUGHT WAS BEING GIVEN TO TYPE AND AMOUNT OF US AID WHICH WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR NAMIBIA.

8. AFTER A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE CLOSE WESTERN COOPERATION ON THE NAMIBIA QUESTION, WHICH HE OBSERVED, HAD HAD AN IMPACT MUCH BEYOND THE CONFINES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, VAN WELL BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF PARTICIPATION IN ANY UN FORCE. HE OBSERVED THAT IF THE US AND FRG DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE WE MUST EXPECT THAT THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS WILL DEMAND TO BE INCLUDED. WHILE THERE IS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO JUSTIFY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, THE GDR'S CLAIM WAS NOT WELL FOUNDED. THIS WAS ONE OF THE POINTS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE FRG DECISION ON
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WHETHER TO TAKE A MAJOR ROLE IN AN UN EFFORT. IN ANY EVENT, VAN WELL SAID, THE FRG'S SUPPORT COULD NOT GO BEYOND A CIVILIAN PRESENCE; THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THE FRG COULD CONSIDER SENDING TROOPS. MOOSE ALLOWED THAT THE US HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS AND THAT THE US WAS

THINKING PRIMARILY OF LOGISTICAL (AIRLIFT) SUPPORT.
IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US AS WELL TO HAVE A
PRESENCE ON THE GROUND BEYOND PERSONNEL NECESSARY FOR
AIR CONTROL OPERATIONS.
BREWSTER

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